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Emergence and Evolution of 
Cooperation Under Resource 
Pressure
María Pereda1, Débora Zurro2,3,4, José I. Santos5, Ivan Briz iGodino6,7,8, Myrian Álvarez6, 
Jorge Caro2,3,4,9 & José M. Galán5
We study the inluence that resource availability has on cooperation in the context of hunter-gatherer 
societies. This paper proposes a model based on archaeological and ethnographic research on resource 
stress episodes, which exposes three diferent cooperative regimes according to the relationship 
between resource availability in the environment and population size. The most interesting regime 
represents moderate survival stress in which individuals coordinate in an evolutionary way to increase 
the probabilities of survival and reduce the risk of failing to meet the minimum needs for survival. 
Populations self-organise in an indirect reciprocity system in which the norm that emerges is to share 
the part of the resource that is not strictly necessary for survival, thereby colectively lowering the 
chances of starving. Our indings shed further light on the emergence and evolution of cooperation in 
hunter-gatherer societies.
Cooperation is critical for understanding how human societies organise and develop diferent kinds of relation-
ships and social interactions1–3. From a temporal perspective, the evolution of cooperation is inseparably linked to 
the socio-ecological context in which resource availability played an important role. In fact, several studies show 
that the availability and access to resources had a substantial impact on the anatomical and functional develop-
ment of our species4,5 and also shaped our strategic behaviour that explains social dynamics6,7.
In most studies about humankind’s evolution and its historical dynamics, the exploitation of resources recur-
rently appears as a factor of study, such as human demographic expansions8,9, the depletion of resources10–12, 
social organisation and social networks13,14, changes or innovations in social and economic relationships15–17, 
the development of hierarchical and complex societies18–21 and even competition and conlict for resources22,23. 
However, an explanatory analysis of how cooperative behaviours (e.g. the sharing of the product of exploitation 
and access to resources) evolve when dealing with changes in resource availability remains largely unexplored.
In order to provide new insights about the relationship between cooperation and resources, we have developed 
an agent-based model (ABM)24 and used computer simulations to study the conditions that promote cooperation 
in hunter-gatherer (HG) societies under diferent resource-stress episodes. he model is a stylised abstraction of 
the basic mechanisms that explain the emergence of cooperation. It does not consider food storage facilities or 
techniques that may condition cooperation (see the review in Angourakis et al.)25–29, nor does it introduce other 
complex assumptions such as social networks or norms. We can claim that the model explores essential questions 
of classical anthropology regarding the importance of cooperation in human history30–33.
Background
Cooperation and sharing have been viewed as a halmark of HG societies33–35. hese practices have been identi-
ied as a long-term strategy to improve the level of welness necessary for managing risks related to the uneven 
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distribution of resources through time and space36,37 as wel as to increase reputation and enhance social capital 
in the context of sporadic food surplus35,38,39. Moreover, cooperation has been proposed as a key factor in the 
expansion of modern humans to the extent that it reduces intraspeciic competition and increases population 
carrying capacities, per-capita growth rates and stability9. Several researchers have also highlighted that coopera-
tive practices and sharing may have been limited by the appearance of powerful imbalances between population 
and resources28,39. Ethnographic and archaeological studies provide plenty of examples related to the relation-
ship between economic crisis and strategies carried out by HG groups to overcome food shortages (migration, 
group ission, infanticide, sexual abstention or the abandonment of old or sick people, among others40,41). hus, 
a decrease in resource availability would have promoted cooperation whenever reciprocity was an operational 
strategy, but once resource scarcity reached a given threshold and reciprocity became less probable, cooperation 
would have been a useless strategy. he chalenge is to identify when this threshold was reached and what options 
societies could choose from to overcome the new scenario.
In order to accomplish this aim, we developed an agent-based model. Modeling alows us to explore multiple 
environmental scenarios42,43 that can address several of these problems. Agent based modeling has been used 
within the frame of evolutionary game theory in cooperation44–46 but also in several archaeological studies (see 
Lake47 for a review of this topic). While there are simulations that analyse the relative contributions of hunt-
ing and gathering to the diet48, most models focus on how speciic tactics relate to overexploitation49 or carry-
ing capacities50, or on how a given population recovers depending on hunting pressure or overharvesting51–53. 
More recently, the role played by cooperation and store eiciency in the emergence and maintenance of common 
stocks25 and the inluence of excessive abundance of common resources in the context of public goods games54 
have been analysed. However, food storage has not been identiied as a spreading strategy in many HG societies 
and remains a topic that needs further development55.
An Agent-Based Model
he next section describes the model folowing a compact version of the ODD documentation protocol56. he 
computational model is implemented in NetLogo 5.357 and the corresponding source code can be downloaded at 
the folowing website: htps:/www.openabm.org/model/5287/.
Overview: Purpose
Cooperation Under Resource Pressure (CURP) is an agent-based model designed to explore the evolution of 
cooperation under diferent resource scenarios that shape individual needs for survival. he model is a very 
stylised abstraction, where resource pressure is modeled by a stochastic process of acquiring resources (i.e. 
prob-resource) and by a parameter of the minimal proportion of the resource unit necessary for survival (i.e. 
min-energy). he model ofers diferent insights about how resource pressure can change the cooperative behav-
iour of any group of individuals, although we have a particular interest in the evolution of sharing practices in 
HG societies.
Other assumptions incorporated in the model are tested:
• he size of the population.
• he exploration of individuals, modeled by a probability of mutation parameter.
• he size of the tournaments used to model the sharing process and the imitation process.
Overview: Entities, State Variables and Scales
he CURP model is an artiicial society of N people agents that represent individuals. he number of people agents 
in the model remains constant during simulation. he state variables that characterise each agent are deined in 
Table 1. he people agent’s strategy is deined by the values of given-energy and correlation variables. People agents 
are not embedded in any spatial structure and can interact with each other with equal probability (wel-mixed 
population assumption).
he study parameters of the model (Table 2) are the exogenous variables established by the user that deine a 
simulation scenario, i.e. a computational experiment, and remain constant in each run.
To simplify the model, we assume that resources provide a unit of energy to anyone who inds them. A peo-
ple agent who gets resources atains a unit of energy and shares a proportion of this unit, i.e. given-energy, with 
other unlucky agents. he resources necessary for survival are deined as a proportion of the unit of energy, i.e. 
min-energy. We do not deine any temporal scale in the model. Time periods have no meaning and the analysis is 
focused on the asymptotic behaviour of the model.
Parameter name Brief description
given-energy he proportion of the resource unit that a people agent is wiling to share.
correlation
his ranges from − 1to 1 and determines the probability of choosing a donee as folows: for positive values, it represents 
the probability of selecting the most cooperative donee (with the highest given-energy) between the set of possible 
donees; for negative values, its absolute value represents the probability of selecting the least cooperative donee (with the 
lowest given-energy) between the sets of possible donees. Otherwise, the donee is chosen randomly.
itnes Fitness is computed as the number of time periods in which the energy obtained by an agent was greater than min-energy.
Table 1.  People agent’s state variables.
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Overview: Process and Scheduling
he scheduling is formed by a set of events that take place sequentialy in discrete time periods (see Fig. 1). People 
agents perform actions in a random order, avoiding any priority for irst-acting consequences. he update of the 
state variables is asynchronous.
In each time period, each people agent draws resources and gets a unit of energy with probability equal to 
prob-resource. hen, each successful people agent shares resources in two steps. First, she chooses a donee among 
a set of unlucky people agents. Second, she gives her a given-energy proportion of the unit of energy; no donee 
wil receive any more energy from other donors if she gets more energy than the survival threshold deined by 
min-energy.
For each donor, the set of possible donees is deined as a sampling among al agents who did not get resources 
(by themselves or from other donors), with the set size limited by sharing-tournament-size. he selection of a 
donee from this set is conditioned by the value of the people agent’s correlation, a variable deined in the interval 
[− 1, 1]. When the correlation is positive, a people agent chooses the most cooperative individual in the set (that 
one with the highest given-energy value) with a probability equal to correlation. Otherwise, she chooses one indi-
vidual randomly. In the other case, when the correlation is negative, a people agent chooses with a probability 
equal to the absolute value of correlation the least cooperative individual (the one with the lowest given-energy 
value). Otherwise, she chooses an individual at random.
Finaly, each people agent updates her itness, deined as the number of non-starving time periods, increasing a 
unit if she has more energy than the min-energy survival threshold. he process of acquiring and sharing resources 
and updating itness is repeated in rounds-per-generation time periods. Ater this time, each people agent updates 
her strategy, i.e. the given-energy and correlation variables, as folows: irst she samples strategy-tournament-size 
people agents of the population, then she imitates the best strategy, i.e. the strategy with the highest itnes if the 
corresponding itnes is greater than her own.
Moreover, each people agent always randomly chooses a strategy between the strategy space with a 
prob-mutation probability. his assumption responds to the hypothesis that a people agent may prefer to explore 
new strategies, or there may be some errors in the imitation process.
Initialisation
he user initialises a run by selecting the study parameters’ values in the interface, corresponding to the scenario 
to be simulated. he people agents are then created according to this parameterisation.
Design Concepts
he basic principle underlying this model is a problem of cooperation. People agents face an unknown distri-
bution of resources. Sometimes they succeed, but sometimes they do not. Sharing resources can imply a cost in 
terms of survival, because the proportion of energy shared by a donor is not conditioned by the min-energy sur-
vival threshold, i.e. a donor always gives a given-energy proportion of her current energy, even though she eventu-
aly remains with less energy than the minimum necessary for survival by doing so. On the other hand, living in 
a population where everyone shares may reduce uncertainty and increase the probability of survival because an 
individual can get resources by herself or from the generosity of others.
Another interesting question that arises in this problem of cooperation is the decision of who to give resources 
to. One might expect that some mechanism of reciprocity emerges in these situations; for instance, individuals 
might prefer to share with others who were generous in the past. Instead of assuming direct reciprocity, the CURP 
model incorporates a more general rule of selection into the agent’s strategic behaviour. An individual chooses 
whom to share with considering the level of generosity and depending on the value of correlation; a positive value 
represents a preference for generous individuals (indirect reciprocity), a negative value represents a preference for 
selish individuals and a zero value represents indiference.
In the CURP model, the evolution of cooperation is the evolution of the level of generosity represented by the 
given-energy variable and the type of reciprocity represented by the correlation variable. he evolution of cooper-
ation is not obvious when the probability distribution of resources and the survival threshold change. Individuals 
in the population wil adapt their strategic behaviour in response to the resource stochasticity and survival pres-
sure in a way that is not easily predictable.
Parameter name Brief description
n-people Number of people agents.
prob-resource he probability that a people agent gets a unit of resource at each time period.
min-energy he minimal proportion of the resource unit necessary for survival.
sharing-tournament-size he percentage of people agents with no resource at a time period that can be chosen as a donee by a particular donor.
strategy-tournament-size he percentage of people agents of the population that a particular agent considers in the imitation process.
prob-mutation he probability that a people agent decides to folow a new strategy randomly chosen from the strategy space.
rounds-per-generation People agents can change their strategy, i.e. given-energy and correlation, every rounds-per-generation time periods.
Table 2.  Study parameters.
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General Behaviour
he parameter space that deines the experiments is summarised in Table 3. A priori, the main study parameters 
of the CURP model that determine the resource pressure are prob-resource and min-energy. However, there are 
other parameters primarily assumed to make the model run that may inluence the model dynamics signii-
cantly. To quantify the importance of the study parameters, we applied a test of variable importance based on 
Random Forests using Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS)58. LHS divides the range of each parameter (see Table 3) 
into N = 3000 strata of equal probability and generates N experiments using a random sampling of these strata, 
ensuring that each stratum is presented in one experiment. his statistical technique is very useful for sampling 
multidimensional distributions.
Each LHS experiment was run 5 × 103 generations, a set of time periods suicient for reaching the stationary 
regime. For al simulations, the average of the strategic variables given-energy and correlation in the population 
was recorded.
he test of variable importance is based on Random Forests (RFs)59. RFs are a statistical learning technique 
used in many classiication and regression problems60. An RF combines predictions of a set of trees, using a boot-
strapping sampling of the dataset to it each tree. In our case, we are not interested in RFs’ predictive capabilities, 
but in identifying the most important variables61. he sampling technique used in RFs always leaves an unused 
subset of data caled “Out-Of Bag” (OOB). For each OOB set, each variable is permuted at random and then 
computed as the Mean Standard Error (MSE) of the RF. Finaly, the importance of a variable corresponds to the 
increase in MSE ater permutation.
Figure 1. Flow diagram of the schedule of execution. he order in which people agents are chosen in “for 
each” statements is always random to avoid bias in agent selection.
Parameter name Range explored
n-people [100,500]
prob-resource [0,1]
min-energy [0,1]
sharing-tournament-size [0,1]
strategy-tournament-size [0.01,1]
prob-mutation [0.01,1]
rounds-per-generation [10,50]
Table 3.  Parameter space for LHS analysis.
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To simplify the underlying regression problem, we applied PCA to convert the set of state variables, i.e. 
given-energy, correlation along with the time period variable, into principal components. hen, we used the irst 
component as the dependent variable in a RF. hese algorithms typicaly include two free parameters that are 
not directly learnt within the data: (i) the number of trees (Ntress) and (i) the cardinal of the random subset of variables (Maxfeatures) that are considered as candidates in each split of the trees (random subspace method)62. he optimal RF parameters are determined using 10-fold cross-validation63,64 in a grid search process. his method 
involves the partition of the data in 10 equal subsamples, and using 9 for training and 1 for the test. he process is 
repeated for each possible parameter combination considered rotating the subsamples used for training and test-
ing, and the results are averaged. In particular, we have explored Ntrees = {100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 800, 1000} and Maxfeatures = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. he optimal parameters found through this process (Ntrees = 800,  Maxfeatures = 5) are used to train a RF with al the available data and to perform the variable importance analysis. Table 4 shows a 
ranking of the relative importance of the study parameters.
he variable importance analysis shows that the general model behaviour depends mainly on two study 
parameters, prob-resource and min-energy, which deine the resource pressure. Considering this, we performed a 
more detailed study of both variables to understand the system dynamics.
The Efects of Resource Pressure
Now we define a set of experiments that correspond to diferent scenarios of resource pressure and study 
the emergence of cooperation via simulation. he two prob-resource and min-energy study parameters have 
been evenly sampled over the range [0.2, 0.8] in steps of 0.1. he rest of the parameterisation was arbitrarily 
set to: n-people = 300, rounds-per-generation = 10, prob-mutation = 0.01, sharing-tournament-size = 0.01, 
strategy-tournament-size = 0.01. Each experiment was run 5 × 103 generations and replicated 30 times.
he resource pressure in the CURP model has two dimensions: a stochastic dimension determined by the 
probability of acquiring resources (i.e. prob-resource) and a quantitative dimension determined by the minimal 
proportion of the resource unit necessary for survival (i.e. min-energy). he resource pressure can be interpreted 
in terms of the specific conjuncture regarding availability of resources that individuals face. The combina-
tion of both parameters in the interval of values sampled sketches a broad series of scenarios, ranging from a 
very low-stress scenario when prob-resource is 0.8 and min-energy is 0.2, to a very high-stress scenario when 
prob-resource is 0.2 and min-energy is 0.8, and intermediate levels of stress for the rest.
Our analysis of the results focuses on the asymptotic behaviour of the population. he strategic behaviour of 
the agents is analysed in the state space deined by the strategic variables given-energy and correlation. To facilitate 
this analysis, we estimated the probability density function using a multivariate kernel density estimation65. he 
data used to estimate the density function are the state of the system during the simulations from the 10,000 to 
50,000 time periods, removing the irst 10,000 periods to reduce the transient efect of the initial conditions.
Figure 2 shows the results as a matrix of plots. Each plot grows in prob-resource from let to right, and grows in 
min-energy from top to botom. Let plots show a low probability of inding resources, while right plots indicate 
a high probability, hence the system is more stressed in terms of the stochasticity when we go towards the let in 
Fig. 2. On the other hand, the top row of plots in the igure represents low values of the energy threshold needed 
for survival, which increases towards the botom. As a result, the system is stressed regarding the quantity when 
we go towards the botom of the igure.
Taking the results of Fig. 2 into account, we can deine three diferent regimes based on the values of the 
parameter combinations.
First, there is a low-stress regime (i.e. low values of min-energy and high values of prob-resource) in the 
top-right area of the plot matrix. Survival in this situation is very likely. Any individual strategy obtains high 
itness and therefore the selection mechanism barely takes action. Movements in the state space are given to ran-
dom drit, but since selection is not important and the strategies do not favour any speciic direction, the average 
strategic behaviour of the population remains at almost constant values.
Second, there is a high-stress regime (i.e. high values of min-energy and low values of prob-resource) in the 
botom-let area. Dynamics are characterised by very unstable behaviour. he high threshold of min-energy and 
the scarcity of resources due to low prob-resource favour low given-energy strategies. However, the population 
simultaneously happens to be constantly searching for strategies to ensure survival. he population is puled 
Parameter name Relative importance
prob-resource 0.3696
min-energy 0.2486
prob-mutation 0.0923
strategy-tournament-size 0.0803
sharing-tournament-size 0.0747
n-people 0.0732
rounds-per-generation 0.0613
Table 4.  Ranking of the relative importance of the study parameters. he scikit-learn python library91 has 
been used to it an RF with the next parametrisation: Ntrees = 800, Maxfeatures = 5, depth = 1000. he impurity node has been used as the measure of the quality of splits. he importance values are positive and add up to 
1.0. he higher the value, the more important the contribution of the corresponding study parameter to the 
prediction of the RF.
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towards any random successful strategy as a consequence of the selection pressure, but any situation is satisfac-
tory enough and the population continuously evolves in the quest for survival.
Finaly, there is a third, intermediate-stress or moderate survival stress regime running diagonal to the plot 
matrix, from let to right and top to botom. In al these situations, population coordinates increase the proba-
bilities of survival and reduce the risk of remaining under the threshold in an evolutionary way. Strategies are 
characterised by retaining the resources strictly necessary for survival and transferring the rest to the population, 
but in a structured manner, as strategies of positive correlation (preferential giving to those that have transferred 
more resources in previous situations) are evolutionarily favoured. Populations self-organise in an indirect reci-
procity system in which the norm is to share the part of the resource that is not strictly necessary for survival in a 
certain time period, hoping that the rest of the population wil do the same in the future. herefore, the probabil-
ity of being under the threshold is colectively reduced. he marginal beneit of keeping the surplus in the model 
is considered as a second-order objective compared with reaching the survival threshold in each time period. 
Figure 2. Matrix of plots of the probability density function of the state space for diferent stress scenarios. 
Each subigure represents the density of the simulation outputs of the model in the space given-energy 
(horizontal axis) and correlation (vertical axis) for diferent values of prob-resource (p in titles) and min-energy 
(e in titles) parameters. In this smoothed color density scaterplot, darker values of (blue) color imply higher 
probability of a simulation of inish with these output values. he prob-resource grows from let to right, and the 
min-energy from top to botom.
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In moderate-stress regimes, the evolutionary pressure causes this beneit to be renounced by the individuals to 
increase the common probability of survival of the rest of the population.
Discussion
he results ofered by the CURP model have interesting consequences for analysing human social behaviour 
related to cooperation. As explained in the irst few pages, cooperation is a paramount element for understand-
ing human social relationships and the development of sociality. HG societies may implement a wide variety of 
strategies that can change according to diferent elements such as the general socio-ecological context, in which 
diferent population densities deal with distinct distributions and concentrations of resources, socio-historical 
dynamics and internal social changes. CURP parametrises both the probability of inding resources and the need 
for a speciic amount of energy for survival, reproducing what might be the diferent socio-ecological setings that 
HG societies faced throughout human evolution and world colonisation. Although technology and production 
have been traditionaly argued as the main factors that explain human capabilities to face new landscapes or 
changing resource availability, the results suggest that a modiication of distribution and consumption paterns 
alow HG societies to deal with changing resource availability.
Within the identiied regimes in CURP, the emergence of cooperative behaviours is the most relevant trend, 
showing that cooperation is a strategy that depends on the possibility of survival, but also on the expectancy of 
reciprocity. hese results also relect that communal behaviour varies along this continuum; despite being stable 
in low- and intermediate-stress regimes, it is unstable in high-stress regimes. While stability provides the possi-
bility of reproducing prevailing dynamics and testing its efect through generations (meaning that cooperation is 
always a communal strategy even though it is performed individualy), unstable strategies are usualy individual.
Low-stress scenarios correspond to contexts in which no environmental or social elements push towards the 
selection of a particular strategy, so that agents behave indistinctly according to previous behaviour. Besides this, 
and because of the absence of forces that drive the development of speciic strategies, these contexts typicaly pro-
mote only slow transitions at the population level. Given the abundance of resources, al strategies are successful 
and cooperation does not increase or decrease.
he high-stress scenario could be tagged as a context of crisis and corresponds to contexts where resources 
become scarcer, surpluses disappear and individual needs are not always fuliled. hese conditions transform 
previous organisational strategies, which are no longer considered eicient anymore. Social organisational inno-
vation may be the key to resolving the critical context (death by starvation and the consequent population reduc-
tion is not considered in the parameters of the model). While the promotion of cooperation reduces intraspeciic 
competition9, such high-stress contexts would promote strategic and organisational change66,67. In this case, this 
means that cooperation and distribution are modiied and social agents try alternatives to prevailing behav-
iour, even though none of them stands out and becomes predominant. he model’s absence of an operative way 
out of the crisis builds a context where the most important trait is a constant quest for solutions: cooperation 
and other innovative options emerge in this context, even though none of them are stabilising. Consequently, 
any specific strategy becomes prevalent, but is quickly substituted by another when adopted by a majority. 
Population-resource imbalance has very oten been considered one of the elements that push societies towards 
organisational changes18,68, which may increase complexity69. Current results from the CURP model strengthen 
the idea that such changes promote both innovation and social transitions.
Finaly, the intermediate-stress context is the most interesting and important in CURP. In this scenario, 
resources appear unevenly distributed and energy requirements also change, either by environmental variations 
or by social changes. Crisis scenarios appear as sporadic episodes showing diferent intensities. his modeled 
context is a robust example of an emergent mechanism of social cooperation: this strategy successfuly establishes 
its ability to improve the survival conditions of HG societies.
In this case, the heterogeneous accessibility to resources promotes the development of their speciic redistri-
bution once they are within the social domain through diferent types of sharing behaviours. Once individual 
requirements for survival are reached, surpluses (which are useless, because the model does not consider storage 
facilities or technologies) are given within a common strategy that prioritises group survival.
his environmental variability, considered within a speciic territory, or the progressive expansion of Homo 
sapiens throughout the planet, was the frame for stabilising cooperative strategies aimed at minimising the efects 
of this variability (e.g. subsistence instability) through sharing behaviours. In the absence of delayed consumption 
provided by storage, group consumption is promoted by sharing and reciprocity in most HG societies to deal with 
uncertainty70–73. he origins of Homo sapiens took place in equatorial areas, but the occupation of other territo-
ries, in the highest latitudes, established new contexts with diferent distribution of resources. In these contexts, 
not only technological innovation but also lexible organisation, and consequently innovation, may have been 
important factors for survival74. herefore, the cooperative enterprise that we ind in many smal-scale societies 
may be the result of a long-run growing strategy to luctuating resources75 and may be considered one of the most 
important social tools in the success of the human species9.
he existence of social norms in smal-scale societies promoting sharing demonstrates the importance of this 
strategy for the sustenance of the group76. Several pieces of ethnographic evidence point to sharing as a particular 
form of cooperation that helps to eliminate the risk of shortages77–80 and is promoted during times of scarcity (see 
the Pumé from Venezuela81, the Copper Inuit82 and others). In addition, food sharing provides the material basis 
for other cooperative behaviours such as the establishment of marriages or political aliances38,83–85. It has also 
been argued that sharing accomplishes a signal function that reinforces the set of cooperative behaviours that 
accompany it86,87.
Social identity, common knowledge and their transmission are key elements of this mechanism: the existence 
of the social memory of critical periods consolidates the cooperative mechanisms88. As a result, the existence of 
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cooperative mechanisms, with their successful options, consolidates the social bonds of HG groups, aiming to 
establish social identities6,86,89,90.
Conclusions
Variations in resource availability have been used extensively as explanatory causes for diferent social changes 
throughout the course of human history. Although organisational changes are considered part of these explana-
tions, research on the emergence of cooperation and the development of common strategies within these pro-
cesses has not yet received much atention. Notwithstanding, the human ability to develop and adopt cooperative 
strategies is precisely the element that has given such macro-ecological advantages to humankind, promoting 
survival in diferent contexts. his paper proposes a model for understanding the inluence of resource availability 
on cooperation. he results show that resource pressure—the balance between population and resources—afects 
cooperative behaviours, speciicaly sharing practices.
he CURP model ilustrates how societies adapt to luctuating conditions through organisational changes. It 
shows that the discontinued intermediate availability of resources favours mixed cooperative strategies in which 
the population prioritises the individual use of the resource to guarantee survival, but sharing practices emerge 
as cooperative strategies to increase population carrying capacities and stability at the same time. he model does 
not include any mechanism to eiciently store and preserve food resources, leading to strategies in which the 
surplus may be exchanged as a risk reduction policy during subsequent periods that are not as fruitful. In this 
context, the model suggests that reputation and generosity could emerge as social capital mechanisms, which 
implies cultural and social. In high-pressure situations, societies dynamicaly explore and test new survival mech-
anisms: exploration is a strong trait in this scenario. he volatility of survival strategies pushes the population to 
highly diverse but unstable situations, inducing a very active dynamic. Hunter-gatherer groups may absorb these 
processes by reducing the population (death, migration, group-spliting strategies, etc.) or by increasing resource 
availability, like by developing social and/or technological innovation, for instance. On the contrary, in low-stress 
situations, social norms and sharing practices are not exposed to adaptive pressure; consequently, the co-existence 
of diferent dynamic practices may emerge. Social change is produced by drit, so transitions are not as abrupt as 
in the other two scenarios. In fact, initial homogeneous norms could remain in societies over long time periods. 
In this context, the historical dependence of previous norms may be very relevant.
As a concluding remark, our results indicate that the existence of diferent management strategies may be 
related to speciic conjunctures, but also to historical dynamics. his is relevant in relation to traditional ideas 
about HG groups that claim that these societies lack their own history and evolution and that they do not inno-
vate or change according to speciic conjunctures.
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